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FROM PUNISHMENT TO
ANNIHILATION: ENGLE V. R.J.
REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.-NO MORE
BUTTS-PUNITIVE DAMAGES HAVE
GONE TOO FAR
I.

INTRODUCTION

Last fall, a Florida jury returned a $145 billion punitive damages
verdict against the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company' and several
other major tobacco companies. That jury rejected the argument by
the tobacco industry that an award of such magnitude would bankrupt the industry. Whether the defendants' financial argument was
correct or not, a $145 billion award3 is colossal and raises questions
as to whether such awards are constitutional or justified as a matter
of public policy.
Punitive damages are not typical tort law damages. Typical tort
law damages are compensatory in nature and attempt to restore
plaintiffs to the position they would have been in had their injuries
never occurred. Unlike compensatory damages, which attempt to
1. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, No. 94-02797, 1999 Fla. App.
LEXIS 13055, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1999), vacating, No. 9402797, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 11937, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1999);
see also Laura Parker & Deborah Sharp, Sentiment on Tobacco Shifts Jurors in
FloridaSmokers' Case Show Disdainfor the Industry, USA TODAY, July 17,

2000, at 3A (reporting that this amount was the result of an aggregated punitive damages award determined by the jury in a class action lawsuit brought by
individual smokers against several tobacco companies).
2. See Myron Levin & Henry Weinstein, Florida Judge Affirms Massive
Tobacco Award, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at Cl.

3. See id. (stating the official amount of the punitive damages verdict was
$144.8 billion, however, to simplify this figure, I will round up to $145 billion
for the remainder of this Comment).
4. See Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden of CorporateMisconduct?, 47
ALA. L. REv. 825, 836 (1996).
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compensate the injured party for both economic and noneconomic
loss, the purpose of punitive damages is somewhat more analogous
to the principles behind criminal law-which are "to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." 5 Punitive damages awards essentially serve the same purpose as fines and penalties, which are imposed "to punish or deter conduct that violates
public policies of the state or federal government." 6 In addition to
this specific deterrence factor, punitive damages are often used to
send a social message of general deterrence. The imposition of punitive sanctions "signal[s] to the entire community
that certain so7
tolerated.",
be
not
will
behaviors
cially harmful
For years, courts have pinpointed these ideals as the purposes
behind awarding punitive damages,8 yet it has never been suggested
that these awards should be able to destroy or liquidate defendants
completely. As a result of changes in punitive damages law and
practice, there has been an increase in both the magnitude and frequency of punitive damages awards. For example, before 1976,
there were only three reported appellate court decisions upholding
punitive damages awards in product liability cases, and on average
the punitive damages were minor in comparison to the compensatory
damages awarded. 9 However, since the late 1970s, there has been an
"unprecedented [increase in both the amounts and the] numbers of
punitive awards in . . . mass tort situations."' 0 As a result of this
phenomenon, it seems the purpose of punitive damages awards is
progressing from punishment to annihilation."1
5. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild":
Proposalsfor Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BRoOK. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (1999) (quoting Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
6. Pace, supra note 4, at 838.
7. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts"as CorporateJust Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (recognizing the propriety of awarding punitive damages).
9. See Schwartz et al., supranote 5, at 1009 & n.34.
10. Id. at 1009.
11. For a discussion of the opposing viewpoint see Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REv. 433, 453 (1994). Phillips
states that there is no punitive damages crisis in this country and that "[i]nsofar
as a defendant feels oppressed by multiple punitive damages awards.., it al-

June 2001]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1515

This Comment explains how the Supreme Court has treated the
issue of punitive damages in recent lawsuits. More particularly, it
addresses whether it is appropriate for courts to impose massive aggregated damages awards. Since it is likely that the Engle matter
will reach the United States Supreme Court, this Comment suggests
how the Court should approach the question of how large a punitive
award may be.
Part II of this Comment addresses the recent increase in punitive
damages claims and the amounts of punitive damages judgments returned against corporate defendants. Part III discusses the Engle v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. case, the most recent damages class action lawsuit where the jury returned a record breaking punitive damages verdict. Part IV proposes, in light of Supreme Court precedent
and policy rationales, that the Engle verdict should be overturned.
Part V suggests possible reforms for punitive damages law, in an effort to prevent the ever-increasing amounts of punitive damages verdicts from threatening the denial of recovery to future deserving
plaintiffs, as well as the threat of liquidation of corporate defendants.
II. INCREASE IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
AGAiNST CORPORATE DEFENDANTS

In the wake of a new millennium where our world thrives on job
opportunities, consumer products and services, and the revenue of
large corporations, it would be in our nation's best interest to protect
corporate defendants, yet this has not occurred. Instead, along with
the increase in punitive damages awards in general, has come a rise
in the number of cases and punitive damages awards against sizeable
corporate defendants. In one of the recent landmark punitive damages cases, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,12 the Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award against a corporate
defendant that was four times the amount of the compensatory damages award. 13 Although the Court upheld the amount of the
punitive award, it expressed some concern for the corporate defendant, noting that the award "may be close to [crossing] the line.., of

ways has the option of bankruptcy." Id.
12. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
13. Seeid. at23.
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constitutional impropriety."' 14 Punitive damages awards are often
challenged on the basis that they potentially deprive defendants of
their property without due process of law, thereby
violating the Due
5
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
A few years later, however, the Court handed down a huge
strike against corporate defendants in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.16 Here, the Court held a ten million dollar punitive damages award against a corporate defendant in a slander of
title action was not so grossly excessive as to violate due process,
even though it was 526 times larger than the compensatory damages
award. 17 If the punitive damages award in Haslip, which was only
four times the compensatory award, was "close to crossing the constitutional line," then certainly a ten million dollar punitive damages
award-which is over five hundred times the actual damages
award-should have categorically crossed the line. By upholding
this award, the Court simply cast aside years of state court decisions
recognizing that punitive damages should bear some proportion to8
the actual damages sustained, as a fundamental issue of fairness.'
Although this was not the case here, and the Court refused to draw a
"mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable,"' 19 a plurality ofjustices agreed
that a grossly excessive and unreasonable punitive damages award
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20
The Supreme Court in this case, however, seemed to express no
mercy for the corporate defendant. This is clearly demonstrated by
the Court's conclusion: "The punitive damages award in this case is
certainly large, but in light of the amount of money at stake ... and
the [corporation's] wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was
14. Id. at 23-24.

15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The text of the amendment states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
16. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
17. See id. at 443, 459.
18. See id. at 459.
19. Id. at 458 (citation omitted).

20. See id.
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so 'grossly excessive.'' 2 ' The majority's cursory treatment of the
possible effect of the defendant corporation's wealth on the excessive amount of the punitive award appears to expose the Court's own
potential bias against large corporate defendants. Similarly, when
the defendant corporation pointed out that the jury's consideration of
its wealth may have increased the risk of prejudice against large corporations, the Court simply stated, "the 'financial position' of the defendant [is] one factor that [can] be taken into account in assessing
punitive damages. 22 However, the Court seemed to turn a blind eye
to the fact that although a defendant's wealth may have been one
factor utilized in determining a punitive damages award, it should
not have been the predominantfactor, as it may have been here.
Justice O'Connor's dissent criticizes the Court's failure to uphold its promise stated in Haslip-to police the potential arbitrariness, caprice, and prejudice that appears to have led to such a large
award in TXO Production Corp.23 O'Connor censures the dramatically irregular and shocking amount of the punitive damages verdict,
24
stating it should at the least "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."
Her glaring dissent centers around the criticism that the monstrous
size of the punitive damages award can only be explained by "the
jury's raw, redistributionist impulses stemming from antipathy to a
wealthy, out-of-state, corporate defendant."' 5 Considering that the
jury was instructed to consider TXO's massive wealth, this may have
encouraged them to transfer some of the large corporation's impressive wealth to the smaller and more sympathetic plaintiffs.26
Justice O'Connor's dissent in TXO Production Corp. points to
what may be one reason for the increase in the size and amounts of
punitive damages against corporate defendants-jury bias.27 Our
system entrusts ordinary citizens to sit as jurors and to make profoundly important determinations. Juries may often use large punitive damages verdicts to express their personal biases against vastly

21. Id. at 462.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 464.
See id. at 473-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 481 (O'Connor, L,dissenting).
Id. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 490 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 490-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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wealthy "Goliath" corporations. 28 How can jurors instructed as to

the deterrent purposes of punitive damages escape the prejudicial influence of information displaying a defendant corporation's net
worth? These cases often appear to the common juror to be a battle
between a feeble, injured plaintiff with limited funds and an abstract

corporate defendant with very deep pockets. Juries may feel a sense
of retribution as well as a need to correct social ills stemming from
the inequality in wealth distribution between needy plaintiffs and
large corporate defendants. 29 Since, "[a]rbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias and even malice can replace reasoned judgment and law as
the basis for jury decisionmaking," modem judicial safeguards have
been enacted to prevent this from occurring.30 Although limiting
jury instructions and judicial remittur exist to attempt to prevent such
bias, it can nonetheless seep through the cracks as it may have in
TXO Production Corp.

Another potential reason for the recent increase in both the size
and the frequency of punitive damages awards may be due to the
creation and emergence of modem mass tort litigation, particularly
the use of the class action lawsuit. A class action lawsuit creates an
efficient way to bring together many plaintiffs and defendants in a
single litigation that binds all the parties involved. 31 The history of
the class action lawsuit can be traced to the seventeenth century
English "bill of peace." 32 This was a procedural device that allowed
an action to be brought by or against representative parties when
three requirements were met: (1) the number of people involved was
too large to permit joinder, (2) all members of the group possessed a
joint interest in the issue being adjudicated, and (3) the named parties
adequately represented the interests of those present. 33 The bill of
peace serves as the basis for the modem class action rule utilized in

28. See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1021.
29. See TXO Prod.Corp., 509 U.S. at 490-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 474.
31. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN,

INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT

LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER

MULTIPARTY DEVICES 26 (1995).
32. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS

683 (7th ed. 1997).
33. See id.
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federal4 courts today-Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce3
dure.
Rule 23 establishes that before a class action can proceed, the
class or group of plaintiffs bringing the suit must meet four main requirements to be certified-numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. 35 Numerosity requires that the size of
the class is so large that joinder of all members would be impracticable. 36 Similar to the English bill of peace, a commonality of ques37
tions of law or fact must exist amongst all members of the class.
The typicality requirement dictates that the questions of law or fact
of the representative parties must also be typical of those of the
class must fairly and adeclass. 38 Finally, the party representing the
39
quately protect the interests of the class.
Rule 23 creates three types of class actions known as 23(b)(1),
23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) class actions. Rule 23(b)(1) allows necessary
use of the class action device to avoid prejudice, either to the class
party or the nonclass party, that might be caused by instituting individual actions.40 Rule 23(b)(2) enables class action suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.41 Rule 23(b)(3), the "damages" class action, that is the focus of this Comment, permits multiple claims for
monetary damages. 42 This last provision is often used in adjudicating mass torts. In a 23(b)(3) class action, two additional prerequisites must be met.43 "First, questions of law or fact common to the
class members must 'predominate' over any questions affecting only
individual class members. Second, the court must find that a 'class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."M
34. Rule 23 was initially codified in 1938, but it was substantially revised
in 1966 to provide clearer guidelines for determining when the class action
format is appropriate. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 134.
35. See COuND ET AL., supranote 32, at 688-93.
36. See id. at 690.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 691.
41. See id. at 692.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
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One of the main purposes of class action lawsuits is to promote
judicial efficiency and to increase access to courts by allowing aggregation of a multitude of individual claims. 45 The class action device can potentially benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. It can enable plaintiffs who may not have sufficient claims, or the financial
backing to bring cases individually, to have their day in court by
pooling their resources with others enabling them to sue collectively.46 Similarly, defendants can potentially save time and money
by litigating multiple claims in one suit. Increased access to courts
leads to more judgments against tortfeasors, which permits class actions to further promote judicial efficiency by47deterring defendants
from engaging in widespread harmful conduct.
The advent of mass tort cases, many of which are litigated as
class actions, has resulted in an increase in punitive damages claims
against corporate defendants. 48 By allowing aggregation of plaintiffs
who may not have had sufficient financial claims to make fighting a
corporation worthwhile, the class action has helped to bridge the gap
between wealthy defendant corporations and individual plaintiffs.
It has essentially given plaintiffs a leg up in the legal process by allowing them to have more bargaining power against their often larger
and wealthier opponents. However, when considering that a class
action allows the issuance of a single damages award that is to be
shared amongst hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs, the size of this
aggregated award may often have crippling effects on corporate defendants as a result of attempting to accommodate too many plaintiffs at one time. Though the mass tort class action is undeniably an
efficient method for managing and redressing several plaintiffs'
claims in one lawsuit, the benefits of the efficiency of issuing an aggregated damages award should not be achieved at the cost of potential corporate destruction.

45. See Recent Cases, Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1809-10 (2000) [hereinafter Developments in

the Law].
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 1810.
See id. at 1809-10.
See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1008.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 1809.
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Ill. THE UNPRECEDENTED VERDICT OF
50
ENGLE V. R. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.

On October 31, 1994, the Circuit Court of Dade County Florida
certified a landmark products liability class action lawsuit brougt by
individual smokers against several major tobacco companies. 5 The
defendants in the action were R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Philip
Morris Inc., Lorrilard Tobacco Co., American Tobacco Co., Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., Liggett Group, Dosal Tobacco Corp.,
the Council for Tobacco Research U.S.A., and the Tobacco Institute.52 The plaintiff class originally certified included "[a]ll United
States citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered,
presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions
caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine. The
class specifically exclude[d] officers, directors and agents of the
[d]efendants. 53 On the defendants' interlocutory appeal, the Florida
District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the class
certification but restricted the class to Florida citizens and residents,
rather than including all United States citizens and residents.-4 The
court reasoned that "[a]lthough there is nothing inherently wrong
about certifying a national class in a state court action... [since this]
class contains so many members from so many different states... [it
should be limited as] it threatens to overwhelm the resources of a
state court... .,55 The court ultimately affirmed the certification of
the modified class and rejected the defendants' appeal challenging
the commonality requirement necessary to certify a class stating that
"the basic issues of liability common to all members of the class will
clearly predominate over the individual issues. 56
50. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. July 14, 2000).
51. See Ronni E. Fuchs, State Rulings Show Florida Court Out of Step in
Tobacco Class Actions, TOBACCO INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., Sept. 8, 2000, at 9;
Judge Outlines Issues for Second Phase of Engle Trial, TOBACCO INDUSTRY
LrrIG. REP., Aug. 27, 1999, at 3 [hereinafter Judge OutlinesIssues].
52. See RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 39 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1996).
53. Id. at40.
54. See id. at 42.
55. Id.

56. Id. at41.
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The jury trial was separated into phases and was designated to
focus on the plaintiffs' conduct and the defendants' conduct separately. Phase I of the trial, which began on July 6, 1998, and ended
of findings-almost all of which were
one year later, set out a series
57
adverse to the defendants.
On July 7, 1999, Phase I of the trial ended as the jury returned
"the first verdict against tobacco companies in a class action brought
on behalf of smokers." 58 In Phase II of the trial, the jury was to determine a lump sum punitive damages award for all class members
whose individual claims were to be heard by different juries in Phase
III of the trial.59 In other words, the jury was allowed to determine
the amount of the punitive damages award the plaintiffs would receive before it determined the issue of the defendants' liability to the
entire plaintiff class. On July 14, 2000, nearly two years after the
start of the trial, the six-member jury set a U.S. record by awarding
the largest personal injury award in history6 0 -a $145 billion punitive damages verdict against the defendants. 6 1 The defendants filed
an appeal to reduce the amount of the punitive damages award, but
their efforts were to no avail. In November 2000, the Florida courts
dealt the corporate defendants another blow as Judge Kaye
decided to uphold the $145 billion damages award even though he
admitted "at first blush, a $14[5] billion punitive damage[s] award
seems so far6 2outside the comprehension of any reasonably thinking
person ....

57. See Fuchs, supranote 51, at 9.
58. Judge Outlines Issues, supranote 51, at 4.

59. See Fuchs, supranote 51, at 9.
60. See Parker & Sharp, supra note 1; see also Myron Levin, Jury Awards
$145 Billion in Landmark Tobacco Case, L.A. TIMEs, July 15, 2000, at Al
(showing that the previous record for an unreduced punitive damages award in

a U.S. court was a $5billion award returned against Exxon for its 1989 oil spill
in Alaska).

61. See Verdict Form for Phase 11-B Punitive Damages at 1-2, Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 14, 2000).
62. Levin & Weinstein, supranote 2 at C1.
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IV. WHY THE ENGLE VERDICT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED

A. Recent Supreme Court Cases Suggest Reasons to Overturn
Excessively Large PunitiveDamagesAwards Against Corporate
Defendants
63
1. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg

In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, Oberg filed a product liability
suit against Honda for permanent injuries he incurred after an accident on one of Honda's three wheeled all-terrain vehicles. 64 Honda
appealed the jury award in favor of Oberg for approximately
$919,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages, claiming it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the award was excessive and Oregon courts
lacked the power to review such verdicts. 65 Without addressing the
issue of whether excessive punitive damages awards in general violate due process, the Court reversed the jury's punitive damages
award and held that state prohibitions against judicial 66review of punitive damages awards violate procedural due process.
In Honda, the Supreme Court took significant steps toward recognizing the necessity of monitoring and reviewing the amounts of
punitive damages awards. Although this was a very narrow holding,
the basic premise of the requisite need for review of punitive damages totals is clear.
67
2. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
In another recent decision, BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore,
the Supreme Court hit a milestone in the war against excessive punitive damages awards. 68 This 1996 decision marks the first time a
majority of the Supreme Court found a punitive damages verdict to

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

512 U.S. 415 (1994).
Seeid. at418.
See id.
See id. at 430-32, 435.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
See Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibratingthe Scales ofJustice 7hrough Na-

tionalPunitiveDamageReform, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1573, 1606 (1997).
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be too high.69 In this case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages because
BMW sold the plaintiff a "new"
car that had been refinished without
70
this.
of
plaintiff
informing the
The Court set out factors to help illuminate "'the character and
standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards' of
punitive damages." 7' First, the Court examined the state's interest in
imposing the punitive damages award to determine whether its interests entered the realm of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause.72 The Court declared that a state cannot impose economic
sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasor's conduct in other states and emphasized that a state's interest
in imposing punitive damages must be based on protecting its own
consumers and economy. 73 Also, the Court established that basic
notions of due process dictate that defendants, in both civil and
criminal cases, receive notice of the conduct that will yield punishment as well as the severity of the penalty a state may impose upon
them.74 To determine if a defendant has received adequate notice,
the Court announced three guideposts to follow in the due process
analysis: (1) the degree of the reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the
disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff, as determined
by the judge or jury, and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the remedy in the case at issue and civil penalties
imposed in comparable cases. 75 Despite the fact that the appellate
court reduced the punitive damages award to $2 million, after applying the above factors, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
punitive damages award was "grossly excessive" and "transcend[ed]
the constitutional limit"
set by the Due Process Clause of the Four76
teenth Amendment.
69. See Bruce J. McKee, The Implication of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damage Litigation: Observationsfrom a Participant,48 ALA. L. REV.

175, 175 (1996).

70. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 572.
See id. at 574 & n.22.

75. See id. at 575-76.
76. Id. at 585-86.
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3. Engle in light of BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore and
HondaMotor Co. v. Oberg
The holding in Honda clearly emphasized the need for "safeguards against excessive verdicts" and that "[p]unitive damages pose
an acute danger of the arbitrary deprivation of property.""7 The Supreme Court should carry this reasoning one step further to establish
that in certain cases where the amount of the punitive damages is unquestionably high, courts should require more than a judge's subjective viewpoint to ensure that defendants are not deprived of their
"property" without due process of law.
One study attempted to test the popular viewpoint that judges,
because of their legal training and experience, are less susceptible
than juries to emotional appeals when determining damage
amounts. 78 The results found that "a jury... on average [would]
yield more reliable, that is, less variable, damage[s] awards than a
single judge would in a bench trial." 79 Hence, this further supports
the proposition that procedural safeguards should be used not only to
review the damages verdicts returned by juries, but also to review
judges' determinations regarding damages totals in order to guarantee that defendants are not unfairly deprived of their constitutional
rights.
The issue of judicial bias must specifically be addressed in
looking to overturn the Engle verdict. Florida Judge Robert Kaye,
who presided over the case, may not have been an impartial judge
considering that he is a former smoker with angina and arteriosclerosis who could potentially benefit personally from the damages verdict.80 Even though Judge Kaye probably would not have permitted
himself to be a juror in this case because of the risk of bias,"' when
one of the defendant corporations asked Judge Kaye to disqualify
himself from the Engle case based on this same reasoning, he

77. Honda, 512 U.S. at 421, 432.
78. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance ofthe American Civil Jury: An EmpiricalPerspective,40 ARIZ. L. REV. 850, 884 (1998).
79. Id. at 885.
80. See Judge Outlines Issues, supra note 51, at 4.
81. See Chamberof Commerce Files Amicus Brief in PhilipMorris'sEffort
to Recuse Judge, TOBACCO INDUSTRY LIG. REP., May 12, 2000, at 6.
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refused.82 Honda's assertion of the need to police the arbitrariness of
damages verdicts should undoubtedly be applied to the Engle casefor judges are not free from arbitrariness, bias, and caprice, simply
because they wear a judicial robe.
The Engle verdict also seems to run afoul of many of the guidelines for determining punitive damages recently set forth by the Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. In Gore, the
Supreme Court articulated that a state's interest in imposing punitive
economic sanctions on a defendant must be to protect its own citizens and economy.8 3 Only then will a state's interest stand within
the boundaries set by the Due Process Clause. 84 This means the
Florida jury in the Engle case did not have the power to punish the
defendant tobacco companies for their conduct, or its effect on those
outside of the Florida class of plaintiffs. Even though the Engle class
was confined to Florida residents, the jury's purpose in issuing such
an enormous punitive damages verdict may have been to punish and
deter the tobacco companies' conduct not only in Florida, but
throughout the rest of the United States. In fact, the plaintiffs' attorney pressed the jury to consider the national effect of the tobacco
companies' behavior in determining the damages verdict. This was
demonstrated in his closing arguments as he stated, "This [tobacco]
industry has left a half-century trail of deceit which has decimated
millions of Americans. Never have so few caused so much harm to
so many for so long, the day of reckoning has arrived." 85 Upon
hearing this statement and presumably others like it throughout the
course of the trial, it seems inevitable that the jury would have considered the economic interests of injured smokers outside of Florida
when determining the amount of the damages verdict-which the
Gore guidelines specifically forbid. 6 Considering that there are few
other explanations as to why the jury would have returned such a
monstrous punitive damages total, other than the fact that the award
was intended to punish the defendants based on national interests,
82. See id.
83. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
84. See id.
85. John Zarella & Susan Candiotti, Big Tobacco Ordered to Pay $145 Billion in Punitive Damages (July 14, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW
/07/14/floridasmokers.verdict.

86. See supraPart IV.A.2.
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Gore dictates the award should be overturned as violating the defendants' due process rights. According to the reasoning announced in
Gore, this global purpose, as opposed to a state specific interest, for
issuing a punitive damages
verdict undoubtedly "transcend[s] the
87
limit.
constitutional
In Gore, the Supreme Court also declared that basic notions of
due process dictate that defendants-even in civil cases-must have
adequate notice of the severity of the penalty a state may impose
upon them.8 8 There was no way the defendants in the Engle trial
could have received adequate notice of the severity of the punitive
damages verdict they were facing since Engle was not only the "first
verdict against tobacco companies in a class action [lawsuit] brought
on behalf of smokers," 89 but it was also the largest personal injury
award in U.S. history.90 Bearing in mind that the Engle verdict was
entirely unprecedented, the defendants clearly did not have notice of
the potential severity of the punishment at issue in this case and thus
were denied their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Additionally, the procedure adopted by the Engle court to determine punitive damages led to circumstances that made it impossible for the defendants to have adequate notice of their potential punishment. The judge allowed the jury to determine the lump sum
punitive damages award total in Phase II of the trial before liability
was determined as to even a single class member, which was to take
place in Phase I1I. 91 The defendants could not possibly have had notice as to the potential magnitude of the punitive damages award
considering that they did not know how many individual class members would pursue claims, what their injuries were, or what their
92
damages were.
When analyzing the Engle verdict in light of the necessity for
scrutinizing the amounts of punitive damages awards suggested in
Honda, as well as the strict guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Gore, 517 U.S. at 586.
See id. at 574-75 & n.22.
Judge Outlines Issues, supra note 51, at 4.
See Parker & Sharp, supra note 1.
See Fuchs, supra note 51, at 9.
See id.
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in Gore,93 it seems inevitable that the monumental punitive damages
verdict in Engle should at the least be reduced, if not overturned.
B. Policy Rationalesfor Overturningthe Engle Verdict
Although the class action is a useful tool to assist in remedying
sizeable social wrongs, courts should not allow class actions to be
abused by using them to impose enormous aggregated punitive damages awards. Recent steps taken toward reducing the excessively
high levels of punitive damages awards as demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Honda94 and Gore95 should translate to the class action arena. Proponents of mass tort litigation assert such "aggregated
solutions present the best hope for ... insuring fairness to claimants
as a group . . . [and] minimizing transaction costs." 96 However,
when considering that a class action allows the issuance of a single
aggregated damages award, two significant problems arise. First, an
aggregated punitive award is issued as a single award that is theoretically to be shared amongst all plaintiffs. In reality however, defendants have limited funds and are often not capable of providing the
entire amount of the damages award. This leaves some plaintiffs
completely uncompensated-unable to recover either their compensatory or punitive damages. The Engle verdict should be decreased
to guarantee that current and future plaintiff classes, who may have
been injured by these same tobacco companies, can recover. In view
of the fact cigarette makers claim "the $144.8 billion punitive
award-[which totals] more than twice their annual gross saleswould financially destroy them," 97 allowing the Engle verdict to
stand could realistically prevent any future recovery by other parties
since the tobacco companies' resources would be drained. It is ironic
that by using the class action in Engle to guarantee that the Florida
93. But see Neil B. Stekloff, Note, RaisingFive Eyebrows: Substantive Due

Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards after BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN.
L. REv. 1797, 1798 (1997) (suggesting that Gore is unsound and unstable as a

matter of constitutional law and that the guidelines set out by the majority in
Gore simply raise more questions than they answer).
94. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
95. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

96. Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
79, 83-84 (1997).
97. Levin & Weinstein, supra note 2, at C1.
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by using the class action in Engle to guarantee that the Florida plaintiffs' harms are vindicated, the class action thwarts and actually prevents future class actions from achieving the exact same goal. This
situation exemplifies how "the class action... has not proven to be98a
feasible means of controlling multiple punitive damages awards."
Although the class action is meant to enable individual plaintiffs to
aggregate claims to increase their likelihood of recovery, the aggregation of the damages award in Engle actually threatens to decrease
the chances future plaintiffs have of recovering damages for similar
injuries.
The second significant problem with allowing aggregated punitive damages awards is exemplified by the astronomical size of the
Engle verdict itself. Using the class action to permit a single damages award to be determined for hundreds and possibly thousands of
plaintiffs at one time undoubtedly encourages and promotes verdicts
of preposterous sizes. When one considers the startling increase in
the size of damages awards, together with the likelihood of
jury/judge bias against large corporations,99 the threat of incurring an
aggregated damage award in a class action is metaphorically like
holding a gun to the head of the defendants. Even if the class actions
against corporate defendants do not proceed to judgement, allowing
plaintiffs to aggregate their claims in such cases can and often does
lead to "judicial blackmailing" of corporate defendants.' 0 In other
words, the mere thought of facing an aggregated punitive damages
award in a class action, coupled with the threat of anticorporate bias,
can be so intimidating that it often "blackmails" defendants into settling claims as early and cheaply as possible.' 0 ' This immense pressure to settle often frustrates the defendants' ability to obtain a judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, even with respect to
frivolous filings which are a constant concern in the context of class

98. Phillips, supra note 11, at 445.
99. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 78, at 870-80 (discussing various studies
showing the recent overall inflation of damages award totals as well as evidence that juries tend to hold corporate defendants "more liable" and to a
higher standard than the law demands, partially because of the deep pocket effect).
100. See Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 1812.
101. See id.
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actions. 10 2 Although allowing an aggregated damage award in class
actions is a valuable tool to ensure injured plaintiffs do not go uncompensated, when one looks at the ever-increasing amounts of
damage awards, it appears this "tool" can unfairly back corporate defendants into a comer and force them to pay regardless of their liability.
Additionally, in determining whether massive punitive damages
awards are appropriate in cases against large corporate defendants,
courts should consider the stigmatizing effect of such awards as well
as their monetary impact. Cases against large corporate defendants
are often widely and adversely publicized.10 3 Adverse publicity following the imposition of a massive punitive damages award will undoubtedly compound the punitive effect of the damages. The severe
damage that can result from the unfavorable publicity of a large punitive damages verdict is clearly demonstrated in Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co. 10 4 In this case, a jury imposed a $3.5 million punitive
damages verdict on Ford for marketing its Pinto automobiles with
fuel systems it knew were dangerously defective. 0 5 As a result of
the negative publicity following this punitive damages verdict,
Ford's Pinto, which had been America's best selling car in the early
1970s, had to be withdrawn from the market.' 0 6 Evidently, not only
will defendants suffer the fiscal impact imposed by the punitive
10 7
award, but they will also suffer the stigma which accompanies it.
Another problem with the Engle verdict is the method of distribution of the monetary damages to the plaintiffs. In Phase II of the
trial, the judge set an order requiring the jury to determine the
amount of punitive damages by applying a lump sum approach. 0 8
This meant the jury would set the punitive damages at a total dollar
102. See id.
103. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 7, at 316 n.121 ("Defense attorneys
and corporate officials viewed adverse publicity as the ultimate sanction posed
by punitive damages .... It is not the payment of punitive damages that is so
greatly feared; it is the publicity and the stigma.").
104. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).

105. See id. at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
106. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 7, at 316-17.
107. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
108. See Judge Outlines Issues, supra note 51.
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amount, which all class members would then share equally. 0 9 This
method of determining damages is the antithesis of the standard
practice of measuring punitive damages, which uses the amount of
compensatory damages as a yardstick for determining punitive damages. 110 Using this method means that every single plaintiff will receive the same amount of punitive damages, regardless of the differing amounts of compensatory damages they receive. Thus, a
slightly injured plaintiff, who is granted a small amount of compensatory damages, and a seriously injured plaintiff, who is granted millions of dollars of compensatory damages, will both receive the exact
same amount of the lump sum punitive damages verdict."' In other
words, the defei3dant is equally "punished" with regard to all plaintiffs when in fact the defendant may not actually deserve such a
harsh punishment.
V. SUGGESTED REFORM OF PuNiTrvE DAMAGES AWARDs iN CLASS
AcTION LAWSUITS AGAINST CORPORATE DEFENDANTS

A. Suggested Reform in PunitiveDamages Law

Although the Supreme Court has set some substantive and procedural limits on the constitutionally acceptable size of punitive
damages awards,"112 the Engle verdict 13 exhibits how courts can easily skirt these boundaries. Punitive damages play an integral role in
our legal system to deter potential defendants from engaging in
similar harmful conduct in the future. However, with the increasing
trend of escalating punitive damages totals, these awards threaten not
only to punish defendants but to potentially destroy them. Below are
some suggested reforms that could be used to restore
balance, fair4
law."
damages
punitive
to
ness, and predictability

109. See id.
110. See id. at 5.
111. See id.
112. See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1003.
113. See Verdict Form for Phase 11-B Punitive Damages at 1-2, Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 14,2000).
114. See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1004.
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1. Quasi-criminal damages should be awarded by
using quasi-criminal standards
Punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, as their purposel5
is to punish reprehensible conduct and deter its future occurrence;"
therefore, they should be awarded by applying quasi-criminal standards. Since most forms of criminal punishment require a requisite
level of intent, so should quasi-criminal civil types of punishment.
Thus before punitive damages can be awarded, plaintiffs should have
to prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendants." 6 Also, because punitive damages are not entirely civil or criminal, they should
not be determined by the civil preponderance of the evidence standard, or by the criminal beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Rather
plaintiffs should be required to prove liability for punitive damages
by an intermediate evidentiary standard-clear and convincing evidence. 1 7 The clear and convincing evidence standard seems more
appropriate since it is less strict than the burden of proof required for
criminal punishment yet more strict than the lenient standard for imposing civil liability. "The clear and convincing evidence burden of
proof should be adopted as a safeguard for the defendant's rights in
recognition of the criminal component of the penalty and to offset
potential bias in favor of the plaintiff and against the corporate
manufacturer." 1 8 Finally, to further correspond with the quasicriminal nature of punitive damages awards, boundaries should be
established in each case to ensure that the punishment is proportional
to the offense. 19 Applying these quasi-criminal standards would undoubtedly help to limit the excessiveness and unpredictability of punitive damages awards in many cases, as well as help to guarantee
that punishment is fairly and adequately determined.
2. Excluding evidence of a defendant's net worth
Excluding evidence of a defendant's net worth would also be a
beneficial reform as it would increase fairness and reduce bias in the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
See id. at 1013.
See id.
Pace, supra note 68, at 1618.
See id.
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120
awarding of punitive damages against corporate defendants.
Studies have shown that juries are often biased against large, wealthy
corporate defendants and often believe that wealthy corporations
should be held to a higher standard of responsibility than the average
individual. 121 In addition, as discussed in Part IV of this Comment,
judges are not immune to bias against corporate defendants either.
Opponents of limiting punitive damages awards may argue that it is
not necessary to exclude all information of a defendant's net worth in
order to prevent jury bias, since juries can be given limiting instructions defining how they should utilize such information in determining a punitive damages award. However, this argument fails as numerous studies have
shown that juries have difficulty comprehending
22
legal instructions.1
Supporters of introducing information of a defendant's net
worth claim that evidence of a defendant's overall financial standing
is crucial to the determination of punitive damages awards. This
claim is based on the rationale that the jury must have access to information regarding wealth in order to impose a higher financial
penalty on wealthier defendants to effectively deter them.'2 However, this argument can be countered as well:
As two noted scholars on punitive damages awards have
explained, "[d]eterrence theory is based on the... assumption that actors weigh the expected costs and benefits of
their future actions. Specifically, a potentially liable defendant will compare the benefits it will derive from an action
that risks tort liability against the discounted present expected value of the liability that will be imposed if the risk
occurs. Whether a defendant is wealthy or poor, this costbenefit calculation is the same. If, as is likely, a wealthy
defendant derives no greater benefit from a given action
than a poor defendant, then both will be equally deterred (or
equally undeterred) by the threat of tort liability. A defendant's existing assets do not increase the expected value of
a given future action. Therefore they do not require any

120. See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1019-23.

121. See Vidmar, supra note 78, at 870-71.

122. See id. at 866.
123. See Schwartz et al., supra note 5, at 1022.
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adjustment in the level of sanction needed to offset that expected value. The defendant's wealth or lack of it is irrele24
vant to the deterrence of socially undesirable conduct."'
Accordingly, to prevent information about a defendant's net worth
from leading to potentially irreversible judge or jury bias and unjustly large punitive damages awards against corporate defendants,
courts should require such information to be excluded from trials.
3. Placing a "cap" on punitive damages awards
One popular suggested reform for preventing limitless punitive
damages liability for corporate defendants in a society where punitive damages awards are increasingly inflating, is the so-called "punitive damages cap." Although how this cap should be determined is
one of the most controversial issues of tort reform, the basic premise
is that this cap would limit the12total
amount of punitive damages that
5
could be awarded in any case.
Placing a cap on the total amount of punitive damages that could
be awarded in any case would not only help to reduce the effect of
jury bias against corporate defendants, it could also remedy the denial of due process that unusually large punitive damages awards
potentially impose. As the Supreme Court noted in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, "[e]lementary notions of fairness.., dictate
that a person receive notice not only of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
[s]tate may impose."' 126 Determining a cap, or maximum amount of
punitive damages that can be awarded, would assist in ameliorating
the due process violation by putting defendants on notice of the
maximum amount of punitive damages they may be subjected to in
27
any given case. 1
Those against placing a cap on punitive damages awards argue
that capping damages would greatly decrease their deterrent value.
The main thrust of this argument is that if corporate defendants are
124. Id. at 1022-23 (quoting Kenneth S.Abraham & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Punitive Damages and the Rule ofLaw: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J.
LEGAL STuD. 415, 417 (1989)).

125. See Pace, supranote 68, at 1620-2 1.
126. 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
127. See Pace, supra note 68, at 1622.
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aware of the specific amount of punitive damages they may have to
face, they will use a cost-benefit analysis to weigh the amount of
damages they may incur in court against the cost to fix or alter their
dangerous product.1 28 If the punitive damages cap is lower than the
cost of repair, opponents of punitive damages caps assert that corporations will not be scared into making repairs since the amount of
damages is no longer a threat. 129 This analysis is based on an unfair
stereotype that paints corporations as overly wealthy abstract entities
that are willing to make a profit at any cost. Corporations consist of
people-logically, it would not be in their best interest to continue to
knowingly market a dangerous product since it may inevitably affect
someone they personally know and love.
Opponents' arguments may also be countered by creating a
damages cap that is not simply an arbitrary fixed amount. Perhaps if
the amount of punitive damages is capped at a certain percentage of
the defendant's net worth, the damages award will still retain its deterrent effect, yet not at the cost of driving the defendant into bankruptcy. Similarly, creating a punitive damages award cap that is not
immutable may not only maintain the deterrence factor, but could
potentially increase it. For example, if punitive damages were
capped at a certain amount for the first offense and then that cap was
increased for each recidivist offense the corporation undertook,
surely even the wealthiest corporations would be deterred by this.
Although the specifics of determining a cap on punitive damages
may be complex, it could be one of the most effective ways to fairly
and justly impose civil punishment on defendants.
B. Alternative Methods of CompensatingInjured Plaintiffs
Perhaps instead of looking to traditional methods of tort law to
compensate injuries inflicted by corporate defendants on large
groups of plaintiffs, alternative methods of compensation that do not
threaten the potential annihilation of corporate defendants should be
used. Injury compensation systems created by legislatures, such as
workers' compensation, provide an excellent model of an alternative
approach to "compensating for injuries outside of the traditional tort
128. See id. at 1624 & n.271.
129. See id. at 1622.
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arena." 130 Many of the goals of injury compensations systems-to
compensate for loss, to enhance safety, and to achieve administrative
efficiency-are similar to the goals of tort law.13 1 Yet these alternative systems compensate plaintiffs for their injuries by means that do
not attempt to manipulate the procedures and goals of tort law to
achieve desired results.
Injury compensation systems seek to anticipate and mitigate the
impact of prospective harms, as opposed to merely compensating
victims after the harm has occurred. In other words, "injury compensation system[s] enable[] society and its legal system[s] to get
ahead of the curve instead of continually playing catch-up in addressing injury problem[s].' 32 As a result of this difference, injury
compensation systems ensure that states are poised and prepared to
deal with harms to large groups of plaintiffs. Consequently, they
may allow such injuries to be dealt with in a faster and more efficient
manner than class actions or mass tort lawsuits which take months, if
not years, to clamor their way through the court dockets. Unlike tort
systems, compensation systems allow the process to be streamlined;
they allow decision making, without such an immense amount of
fact-finding, by building presumptions of entitlement into the system
33
itself.
Another positive effect of injury compensation systems is that
they may be more effective than traditional tort liability in promoting
safety. Proponents of traditional tort liability, such as punitive damages awards in mass tort product liability and class action lawsuits,
claim that without unlimited potential tort liability for defendants,
many large corporate defendants would recklessly manufacture unsafe products. 3 4 However, this argument fails to recognize that the
"threat" of unlimited tort liability will fall short of deterring those
130. Paul A. LeBel, Beginning the Endgame: The Search For an Injury
Compensation System Alternative to Tort Liability for Tobacco-Related
Harms, 24N. KY. L. REV. 457, 464 (1997).
131. See id. at 466.
132. Id. at 467.
133. See id. at 479.
134. See Cynthia Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturer of This ProductMay
Have Engaged in Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for
Limitless Punitive Awards in ProductLiabilityLawsuits, 73 IND. L.J. 187, 216
(1997).

June 2001]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1537

corporate defendants that do not face a realistic risk of exposure to
tort liability. Injury compensation systems implemented by legislatures may not only have a greater deterrent effect than tort liability,
they may also increase safety more effectively. This is based on the
fact that these systems force corporate defendants to consider the accident costs for which they could be held liable; hence they would be
more likely, when facing this inevitable threat, to take steps to increase safety measures to prevent injuries before they occur.
One very attractive feature of many injury compensation systems is their "tendency to restrict compensation to pecuniary
losses." 136 These programs tend to limit the types of damages defendants can be held responsible for, thereby preventing the destructive
potential of tort law's limitless liability. For example, workers'
compensation typically limits benefits to medical and rehabilitation
expenses incurred as a result of injury, partial replacement of wage
loss due to the injury, and death benefits to those dependent on the
injured party. 37 Here, the defendants pay for the damage they cause
within limited boundaries of liability, preventing, or at least reducing, the risk of destruction of corporate defendants.
Although injury compensation programs often develop out of
policies and ideals of tort law, they seem to more effectively strike a
balance between the plaintiffs' and the defendants' interests. Overall, injury compensation programs work toward ensuring that defendants fully compensate injured parties for their loss while deterring
future conduct and promoting safety, -withoutthe threat of liquidating
corporate defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION

Punitive damages are an essential element of our civil remedial
scheme. They punish defendants and deter others from engaging in
similar harmful conduct in the future.1 38 Punitive damages are necessary to teach defendants they cannot freely engage in intentional or
careless conduct that causes harm to others. Similarly, class action
lawsuits act as an important legal device to enable several plaintiffs
135.
136.
137.
138.

See LeBel, supranote 130, at 471.
Id. at 468.
See id.
See Stekloff, supranote 93, at 1798.
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to aggregate small individual claims into one large claim to increase
their chances of attaining adequate recovery. Although class action
lawsuits and punitive damages awards together are fundamental tools
which exist to protect plaintiffs from new social threats as they
emerge, it is necessary to place limits on these tools to prevent them
from potentially destroying corporate defendants. It seems the primary purpose of the BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore decision
was to send a message to lower courts to "tighten the reigns on punitive [damages] awards."' 139 The verdict in Engle clearly illustrates
that this message has been ignored. 140 It is time the Supreme Court
sends a stronger message: No more excuses, punitive damages have
gone too far.
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139. McKee, supra note 69, at 225.
140. For examples of other cases that have ignored or circumvented the
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Mar. 24, 2000, at 14.
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